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Using the Space Shuttle
Columbia Begin Bringing
the Moon to America
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How Columbia Can Help Bring
the Moon to Americans 
Flying a Re-Engineered OV-102 Columbia at
Marginal Cost to Repeatedly Launch Small, Low-Cost,
Devices to the Moon -
A Method of Generating Data, Revenue & Public
Interest
Addressing the Why, What & How of Leading America Beyond Earth Orbit
The purpose of this paper is to propose a realistic enterprise framework that addresses how
America’s space program resources can best serve its free enterprise system as it expands
above and beyond Earth orbit. Before completing the discussion, three important questions




Why would America commit one of its Shuttles to launch devices beyond Earth orbit?
What could private interests accomplish if they had at their disposal a routine,
profitable means of transportation to the Moon? Are there any enterprises currently
envisioned that urgently need a low cost, routine, medium lift capability?
HoW can we best take advantage of our existing launch infrastructure and experience
to serve private industry’s desire to begin earning profits from ground-based
enterprises that use revenue-generating devices on the Moon? HoW could we use our
existing capabilities to not only serve immediate opportunities, but also use them as a
means of creating a public demand for engineering far more efficient space
transportation systems of the future?
Recently, there have been efforts to determine how to use a Space Shuttle to return an
American to the Moon at some cost goal. This is a good thing to do for planning the creation
of a space infrastructure on the Moon. However, given the tremendous economic potential of
human interest in space -is this the best thing America could be doing now with one of its
Space Shuttles?
Should we endeavor next to return an American to the Moon - or, should our
next national achievement in space be to bring the Moon to all interested
Americans?
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Bringing the Experience of Being on the Moon to All Interested Americans
A very
No longer will we have to wait for in-space theme parks to open up for us to
experience being in space - the 21st century American dream of exploring and
interacting with the space frontier may well be affordable and achievable for us to
begin now through the development of ground-based space theme Parks.
We do not necessarily have to wait for a Shuttle replacement - although, if the
enterprise truly takes off, there will be a market demand for a replacement.
interesting aspect of the upcoming Mars Pathfinder Rover mission is not just the
technical achievement of operating a micro-robot on the surface of Mars. Nor is it the
potential scientific data that will be collected. The most intriguing aspect of the device is its
revenue-generating capability and the impact this could have on Americans interested in
exploring space.
A recent Civil Space Transportation Study (CSTS) 1 noted that one of the most realistic, near-
term markets is something they referred to as “ground-based space theme parks. ” In this
vision of space enterprise, people come to visit attractions that are at once entertaining and
educational. People pay to see it, they are entertained and, perhaps, they have encountered a
new frontier and experience that inspires them to learn more, experience more and interact
more.
Planetariums, science museums, aquariums, and Disney’s EPCOT are but a few examples of
similar financial ventures. Imagine allowing visitors to observe or participate in live lunar
excursions with audience participation, exploration and inquiry. This would generate an
increasing degree of public interest, revenue, as well as scientific and technical data.
(LunaCorp, Arlington, VA)
A ground-based space theme park is one example of the kinds of enterprises that could
be initially sustained through the use of a designated Shuttle Orbiter
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University departments may decide to jointly invest and partner with technology firms to
conduct civil engineering, mining, power generation and other industrial experiments with
remote devices that the y own and operate.
Once initiated, private industry (e.g., power-generating companies, mining and construction
interests) may also see opportunities for earning revenue by providing basic infrastructure
needs that expand upon the primitive capabilities that ignited the enterprise. Such an endeavor
would represent a process of bringing the Moon to America - perhaps a required step before
Americans will be willing to relinquish billions of dollars to send an American back to the
Moon.
Lifting Free Enterprise to the Moon Requires a Steadily Increasing Annual Flight Rate
Taking entrepreneurial visions to the Moon will require providing the customer a sizable and
steadily increasing annual lift capability. This will mean bringing together engineers,
scientists, businessmen, and marketing experts to strike the right balance between
performance, operations and economics if the proposed space transportation service is to
sustain a market. Specifically, technical skills would be needed to focus space transportation
system improvement not only on how much it can deliver from launch to deployment, but how
often it can deliver. By truly serving the needs of free enterprise, engineers and scientists
(government and industry alike) must take the time derivative, so to speak, of the rocket
equation and derive systems that provide an ever increasing number of affordable pounds to
orbit per year.
An expanding economy in space will require not only cost reductions in launch services -it
will require steadily increasing revenue from the devices launched into space. This has been
the case for ownership and leasing of transponder space on communications satellites, and will
undoubtedly be the case for free enterprise expansion beyond Earth orbit. In order to sustain
and grow these enterprises it will be necessary to maintain and service the operation of these
remote devices as well as provide the capability to keep up with demand for their use. This
will require space transportation systems that possess the capacity to meet the challenge of
increased flight rates.
A Profound Realization - We Can Initiate Lunar Enterprises Now With One Shuttle
With the advent of small (less than 100 lb.) tele-operated devices such as NASA’s Mars
Pathfinder Rover, which is to be launched this year ( 1996), it seems possible to contemplate
today the beginnings of an enterprise that lands many such devices on the Moon. The next
obvious questions are 1.) how many such devices could be landed each year, 2.) how could
revenue be generated from them, 3.) what would they do, 4,) how much revenue could they
generate, and 5.) what would be the annual launch expenses to continually land and maintain
them? Finally, what are the prospects of increasing current launch capability over time should
the enterprise take off?
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In pondering such issues, a profound awakening is occurring:
Question: Just what type of space transportation system is required to ignite
a billion dollar, sustained enterprise on the Moon?
Answer: The Space Shuttle Columbia. Particularly, if it is re-engineered over
time for a higher flight rate - from the current three (3) per year to, perhaps,
seven (7) per year. Additionally, since it is overweight to perform meaningful
transportation services for the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA)
program, it is an ideal vehicle to choose for such an enterprise.
Flying Columbia for Both Space Flight Development and a National Enterprise
The Space Shuttle Columbia can be operated cheaper than most popular expendable launch
systems if its launches are provided at marginal rates. That is, the additional cost of
operating Columbia, after the other vehicles’ costs have been accounted for in support of the
Space Station program, is about an order of magnitude lower than the average Shuttle cost
per flight (about $500M at the currently budgeted seven flights per year)2. Assuming free
enterprise were allowed to pay only the marginal cost of operating Columbia for their use, a
demand could be created (at least for one reusable Orbiter) for engineering higher and higher
flight rates at lower and lower costs per flight.
It should be clearly recognized, however, that the use of Columbia only makes sense for the
start-up and initial take-off phases of the enterprise. The Shuttle system, even with the
enhancement suggestions envisioned, will reach a limit that will drive the nation toward
advanced space delivery systems. The use of a Shuttle for starting a lunar enterprise,
therefore, is not the answer for space delivery, but rather our next opportunity.
Re-Engineering Columbia in Support of a Lunar Enterprise
Utilizing the Space Shuttle Columbia for a lunar enterprise is envisioned to require a two step
process. First, re-engineering of the processes (both on and off-site) involved in preparing
Columbia for re-flight in the context of a focused cargo delivery role. The second phase
would re-engineer some of the vehicle systems and components themselves to allow lower
levels of servicing, test time and repair. This would allow the Columbia work force (across
the program) to achieve greater effectiveness by launching it more often (i.e., without
requiring added engineering, program control, overtime, shift work, facilities and
infrastructure in general).
The Space Shuttle Columbia can be operated today at a flight rate of three flights per year.
This has been repeatedly demonstrated on Shuttle Orbiters. The highest flight rate attained by
any one Orbiter in one year is five3. This occurred when Discovery flew four commercial
missions deploying a total of twelve spacecraft (plus a fifth DOD deployment mission) from
August, 1984 to August, 1985. With one exception (the STS 68/SRL-02 flight in 1994), all
Shuttle Orbiter flights have required extra work to disassemble the payload accommodations
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from the previous mission and assembly of unique payload accommodations for the next
flight. With a single mission requirement for the newly designated Orbiter, i.e., upper stage
deployment in low earth orbit (LEO), there would be no need to conduct extensive aft flight
deck work, nor expensive and time consuming payload bay and mid body reconfiguration.
With a focused cargo delivery role, Columbia’s on-orbit stay time requirement (by the
payload) should be drastically reduced to only hours, not days or weeks - resulting in further
launch-to-launch time savings. The American people and the marketplace would be
anxiously waiting for the next delivery (i.e., new exploration opportunities and the prospect of
lower public access costs).
Also, the Shuttle flight software development, Shuttle mission design and crew training
processes become limited in scope and more affordable (for the customer reimbursing the
Shuttle program) if accounted for using the marginal cost approach.
Additionally, since the deployment mission is relatively simple to conduct, only a small flight
crew would be needed. There would be few, if any, mid-deck lockers to build up and install,
fewer crew seats - the total focus would be on delivery of lunar packages for the benefit of
Americans. Again, some of these will be paying customers as visitors to theme parks,
planetariums or science centers, some as investors in a business venture, while others as
students or professors in academia anxiously awaiting his or her opportunity to explore and
interact with the space environment.
Several forces have led the Shuttle program to manifest unique payload missions only and thus
incur the ensuing Orbiter work to accommodate them. First, we no longer see commercial
deployments from Space Shuttle Orbiters. Additionally, with the advent of Space Station
operations, unique science missions are best suited to be performed there rather than on
dedicated Shuttle flights. As a result of this and the recent change in orbit inclination for the
ISSA, the Shuttle program now has surplus launch capacity with its Orbiter Columbia. This
surplus comes not only in the form of an Orbiter - but also as facility space and engineering
talent. Further definition of national space launch policy is required, however, to take full
advantage of this surplus as an opportunity for American free enterprise. The nation now has
a choice to eliminate the “excess” or provide them with a relevant framework to once again
serve the American public.
Next: Re-Engineering the Vehicle for Lower Cost and a Higher Flight Rate Capability
The Space Shuttle Columbia, with a focused cargo delivery role, would be an ideal vehicle to
take full advantage of mature technologies awaiting flight demonstration. Focusing
development changes on one vehicle, prudently, over time, avoids production investments best
left for advanced transportation projects (for example, the X-33). Using design, development,
test and evaluation (DDT&E) resources only to include first unit acquisition would allow
optimization of the design (including flight operation, turnaround and cost performance)
without incurring any production costs. If the development improvements on Columbia prove
(through actual flight and turnaround use) to be cost effective, then at that time the launch
vehicle organization(s) could pay for their production for use on the other vehicles.
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Application of more robust and dependable thermal protection technologies in high damage
areas of the vehicle would be an appropriate first choice. Some technologies have already
proven their wear and tear maturity on previous flights. One reason for their limited
application is the production costs that would be incurred to retrofit the entire Shuttle fleet
without an associated demand for fully utilizing their turnaround benefit. Other opportunities
include development of maintenance-free wings, i.e., the elimination of corrosion control
work, more robust leading edge insulators, simpler and maintenance-free aerosurface hinge-
line sealing mechanisms, etc.
Additionally, simplified, more dependable and more operable actuation systems can be
demonstrated. Simple candidates that can realize immediate benefit include electrically
operated landing gear, brakes, nosewheel steering control, and Orbiter to External Tank
umbilical retraction actuators. Developing completely sealed hydraulic systems (i.e.,
remaining sealed launch after launch) can be enabled through application of high performance
electric pumps or through high-powered electric power distribution systems for electro-
hydrostatic actuators. This can increase the vehicle’s capability to be quickly and affordably
prepared for launch and alleviate the need for the overtime and shift work expense involved
with operating, servicing and sampling ground hydraulic equipment.
Also needed is the development of rapid and autonomous vehicle power application through
the use of advanced, low power avionics. If designed for, this could enable ground vehicle
processing operations that are free from complex ground cooling support equipment. This
would also result in significantly simplified operations with lower levels of required support.
Other avionics advances that would allow faster and simpler turnaround include combining
navigation functions into an Integrated Global Positioning Satellite/Inertial Navigation System
(GPS/INS).
Still another avenue worth pursuing includes combining the H2/02 fuel cell power reactant
storage & distribution system (PRSD) with the forward reaction control system. What is
envisioned here is development of a forward reaction control module fueled not directly from
the ground with toxic/hazardous propellants, but rather utilizing common tank storage for
both the fuel cells and H2/02 gas-gas reaction jets. This propulsion technology has already
been flight demonstrated on the McDonnell Douglas DC-X. Using this approach on
Columbia would benefit the X-33 program by providing a full scale, orbital flight
demonstration of the technology, while at the same time the customers would get the benefit
of a more affordable and responsive launcher in the near term.
Many other innovations are expected to arise from the smallest of improvements to more
ambitious system technology innovations. Contractor operators and the government flight
test engineers at the launch site would have an incentive to work directly with design
engineers and researchers across the country - not only within the Shuttle program, but with
other programs, such as X-33, commercial aircraft design teams and airline operators. With
this type of teamwork, and a structured framework to organize for improvement, there should
bean ability to double the current flight rate capability while lowering the per flight costs of
operating the Columbia.
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S u m m a r y
An engineering framework has been examined for improving the flight rate capability and per
flight cost of operating one Space Shuttle Orbiter. How this maybe achieved has been
outlined in terms of system and component upgrades that can be demonstrated in orbital flight
and at full scale. What role this Orbiter would fulfill in demonstrating a higher flight rate has
been identified to be a cargo deployment only role.
Private demand for lunar enterprises that continually deliver revenue-generating devices to the
Moon for public benefit on Earth is forwarded as a realistic, near-term justification for
pursuing this approach. The approach not only promotes maturing space transportation
technologies, but also provides the chance for government developmental resources (such as
Shuttle Columbia) to cooperatively serve America’s expanding free enterprise system.
Conclusion
American dreams of space exploration beyond Earth orbit are all around us. From
LunaCorp’s and others’ visions of starting ground-based space theme parks to SpaceCamps,
science centers, I-Max movies, and planetariums. Consider the success of the many space-
related television programs, theater films and videotapes.
In NASA’s latest Strategic Plan one can read that “NASA is an investment in America’s
future. As explorers, pioneers, and innovators, we boldly expand frontiers in air and space
to inspire and serve America and to benefit the quality of life on Earth.” It further states that
“in fulfilling its mission NASA contributes to America’s goals in . . . economic growth . . .
educational excellence . . . and peaceful exploration and discovery.”
Cooperatively using the Space Shuttle Columbia with private firms to initiate lunar
enterprises, while simultaneously developing space transportation technologies, can serve to
unite NASA’s strategic enterprises in space sciences, space access and technology and in the
human exploration and development of space. If we are successful, those of us who have the
privilege of working with NASA and its contractor work force will have served the public by
bringing the Moon to the marketplace and thereby making their public investments in space
research significantly more relevant. With global competitors having stated that they are
heading to the Moon and beyond, with or without the United States, NASA can no longer
afford to postpone making its strategic goals truly relevant to the American dream of
exploring and leading free enterprise into space.
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